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Introduction 
By 2015, the harsh economic austerity measures enforced upon Greece by 
the Troika, made up of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European 
Commission, and the European Central Bank (ECB), in return for bailout loans 
designed to keep the country afloat, had resulted in widespread 
impoverishment for the Greek people. Between 2009-2014 severe material 
deprivation in Greece rose from 11% to 21.5% of the population, and the 
poorest 10% of the populations lost 56.5% of their income (Truth Committee 
on the Public Debt [TCPD], 2015: 40). The disastrous social consequences of 
austerity fomented an all-out confrontation between Greece and its 
creditors.  
The Greek general election in January 2015 brought the radical, anti-
austerity party, SYRIZA, to power in the Hellenic parliament. In power, SYRIZA 
attempted to reverse the austerity measures at home, whilst also trying to 
renegotiate the terms of the debt with the Troika. What followed was a 
frenetic and combative period of negotiation between the Troika and the 
SYRIZA government, represented by Greek prime minister, Alex Tsipras, and 
his heterodox finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis. SYRIZA framed their 
arguments in terms of their own democratic legitimacy, culminating in the 
famous 5 July referendum, in which Greek citizens overwhelmingly voted ‘όχι’ 
(no) to the renegotiated bailout package set out by its lenders. They also 
attempted to use legal arguments to question the legitimacy of the debt. In 
short, SYRIZA’s first 8 months was defined by a political movement of Hellenic 
defiance that threatened to overturn the Troika’s imposition of austerity. As 
we now know, however, the radicalism of the first SYRIZA government ended 
in failure, capitulation and a more ‘moderate’ approach in its second 
parliamentary term.  
One of the initiatives of the first, more radical SYRIZA government was 
the development of the Truth Committee on the Public Debt (TCPD), which 
was established in April 2015 and tasked with investigating Greece’s 
sovereign debt. The TCPD was intended to support the Greek government in 
its negotiations with its creditors and pursued its investigations to formulate 
arguments concerning the cancellation of Greek debt. In June 2015, it 
published a preliminary report in English and Greek that challenged both the 
dominant narratives regarding the key causes of Greece’s spiralling sovereign 
debt and the legality of specific debts according to international law.  
Although the TCPD was prematurely closed as a consequence of 
political schisms that opened up within SYRIZA (Toussaint & Lemoine, 2017: 
34-53), legal scholars have recently shown that the arguments it developed 
are well supported in international law and significantly challenge the 
Troika’s narratives regarding the debt from an economic, legal and political 
perspective (Bantekas & Vivien, 2016). Despite its untimely demise, the TCPD 
thus has much to offer in terms of legal strategy and practice regarding the 
cancellation of sovereign debt beyond the immediate context of the Greek 
crisis. 
Nevertheless, my interest in the TCPD does not centre upon the 
efficacy of its legal arguments, even if their efficaciousness remains important 
to the analysis I develop here. Rather, I am interested in the TCPD because it 
attempted to problematise and address broader and significant questions 
regarding the now ever-present social context of financialisation and debt, 
which has been of increasing concern for sociologists and social theorists in 
the decade since the 2008 global financial crash (See: Adkins, 2017; Federici, 
2014; Joseph, 2014; Lazzarato, 2012, 2015; Mulcahy 2017), and which is 
treated across this volume. In other words, I am concerned with how the 
TCPD contests the socio-political problem of debt engendered by 
financialisation, and what lessons we might take from its practices in our 
ongoing engagements with these issues. 
Taking this perspective, this chapter develops a theoretical analysis of 
the TCPD as an important and strategic response to a specific modality of 
power which is central to post-crash neoliberalism. Setting out the terms of 
this governmental technology, the chapter follows Maurizio Lazzarato (2012; 
2015) in insisting that financialised neoliberalism operates through a 
mnemotechnics of debt, or, to put it another way, a project of memory that 
does the crucial work of legitimising and sustaining recourse to neoliberal 
austerity policies by making citizens ‘guilty’ and thus deserving of them. As 
such, my argument is that the TCPD is worth our critical attention because it 
responds precisely to this ‘mnemotechnical’ modality of power. This chapter 
thus analyses the TCPD as a project of memory-making that responds to the 
mnemotechnics of the debt economy, by strategically reversing its logic. 
Exploring the ways in which the TCPD draws from memory-making 
practices developed within the international human rights movement, I 
analyse the TCPD as a practice of counter-memory that shapes a narrative of 
the Greek debt which demonstrates the innocence of Greek citizens and thus 
frees them from guilt. The importance of this strategy, I suggest, should not 
be underestimated. If the mnemotechnics of debt constrains human action 
and social organisation within neoliberal rationalities by making us ‘guilty’ for 
our debts, then the TCPD attempted to reverse this logic and create space for 
alternative, egalitarian futures to emerge, even if they ultimately failed to 
materialise. Although it is critically important to acknowledge and come to 
terms with this failure, the TCPD’s strategy of counter-memory, I conclude, 
remains an important precedent for thinking through and resisting the 
current conjuncture of financialised neoliberalism. 
Guilt and Responsibility: the ‘Power’ of Memory 
Understanding the prescience of the TCPD as ‘memory-making’ first requires 
us to grasp the configuration of power operating across the Greek crisis that 
makes this form of resistance necessary. Above all, the situation in Greece 
should be understood within the general context of both the global process 
of financialisation and the monumental crisis of financialised capitalism that 
began in 2008. Literature on financialisation has long emphasised that the 
proliferation of finance (and thus indebtedness), emerged alongside the 
conjunctural shift towards neoliberalism which took place in the 1970s 
(Dumenil & Levy, 2005; Marazzi, 2011). As authors such as Marazzi (2011) 
have noted, the explosion of finance emerged as a way of supplementing the 
stagnant wages that followed the turn towards neoliberal economic policies. 
In this sense, the neoliberal project, which combines the demands of 
marketisation, privatisation, and deregulation with the production of 
individuals as ‘entrepreneurs of the self,’ (Foucault, 2010: 224) has been 
fuelled by cheap credit that has extensively financialised social existence.  
It was precisely this conjuncture of financialised neoliberalism that 
came into crisis with the 2008 financial crash. The crash represented a 
moment in which large rates of mortgage default destroyed the value of 
securities held by major banks, leading to a liquidity crisis that threatened to 
undermine the whole economic system. Consequently, the present is one in 
which the avatars of financial capital are calling in their debts. If finance was 
once credit which ‘functioned to sustain our aristocratic fantasies of 
“conspicuous consumption”,’ as Yannis Stavrakakis (2013: 34) has put it, 
finance has now been rearticulated as debt, which initiates a new 
governmental logic of accountability, austerity, and, above all, repayment. 
The Greek crisis represents an important node in the development of this 
new socio-economic conjuncture. Since the first bailout package of 2010, the 
Greek state has had to make round after round of social spending cuts, 
structural adjustments all made in the name of repaying debt, or, at least, 
making public debt ‘sustainable’.  
At the centre of this new governmental logic is a project of memory, a 
‘mnemotechnics’, which can be best understood by turning to Maurizio 
Lazzarato’s now famous work on neoliberalism and the debt economy (2012; 
2015). For Lazzarato, indebtedness constitutes a generalised condition of 
post-crash society, a conjuncture which he calls ‘the debt economy’. For 
Lazzarato (2012: 29), debt is also a modality of power specific to this 
conjuncture; it functions as a ‘“capture”, “predation”, and “extraction” 
machine on the whole of society, as an instrument for macroeconomic 
prescription and management [and] a mechanism for the production and 
‘government’ of collective and individual subjectivities.’ In the present 
moment, debt is thus a practise through which power operates in 
simultaneous and mutually reinforcing ways at both the macro level of social 
structure and the micro-level of subjectivity and human conduct.  
Above all, for Lazzarato the governmental value of debt is in its ability 
to establish an asymmetrical and hierarchical power relation between 
creditors and debtors, one that is increasingly generalised across all social 
relations. Lazzarato argues that debt has produced a form of social 
organisation in which an increasingly small creditor class is constituted at the 
expense of subjugating the rest as debtors. It is this hierarchy of debt, 
Lazzarato (2015: 66) argues, that ‘capitalist elites would like to apply to all of 
society.’ While much of this framework if valuable for this analysis, what is 
especially important for our purposes is that it is precisely within the content 
of this relation between creditors and debtors that memory appears as a 
pivotal technique of power. For the hierarchical relation between creditors 
and their debtors is instituted and mediated by a mnemotechnics or ‘art’ of 
memory which is intrinsic to its workings. 
Drawing from Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, Lazzarato (2012: 39-
41) argues that debt is rendered both intelligible and operational through the 
promise of repayment. It thus necessitates producing a subject capable of 
promising, that is, someone who can stand ‘as a guarantor for themselves.’ It 
is precisely through this act of the promise that the debtor is temporally 
bound and subject to the creditor; or more accurately to the promise of 
future value for the creditor. But promising requires memory: for ‘making a 
person capable of promising means constructing a memory for him [….] a 
conscience, which provides a bulwark against forgetting.’ In other words, 
promising is a speech act that requires a memory of the act to fulfil it. It is 
thus not a memory created ‘for conserving the past,’ but a ‘memory of the 
future,’ (45) one that makes the debtor answerable to the promise made to 
the creditor at a future date.  
Memory acts as the conduit which gives stability to debt both as ‘a 
specific morality of promise (to honour one’s debt) and fault (for having 
entered it),’ (Stavrakakis, 2013: 34). Memory constitutes and maintains the 
debt relation by forcibly inscribing concepts of responsibility (to repay one’s 
debts) and guilt (for one’s indebtedness), into the interiority of the subject. 
For Lazzarato (2012), this means that the mnemotechnics of guilt and 
responsibility is an operation of control that subjects the debtor to the power 
of the creditor. More precisely, memory is the means by which the creditor 
externalises responsibility for indebtedness to the debtor in such a way as to 
seize control of the debtor’s future. For in the act of promising the debtor’s 
field of possibilities is constrained by the memory of debt, which 
responsibilises her by committing her to undertake forms of conduct that 
make her more likely to meet her responsibilities to the creditor.  
Crucially, Lazzarato shows that in the era of post-crash neoliberalism, 
the mnemotechnics of debt has entered new and specific configurations of 
governmental practice. Under the debt economy, Lazzarato (2012: 47) 
argues, debt has both been ‘rediscovered’ and scaled up as a generalised 
‘technique of government aimed at reducing the uncertainty of the behaviour 
of the governed,’ because it can control ‘temporalities of action,’ by locking 
up ‘possibilities within an established framework,’ (71). Debt, as a technology 
of memory, is now used as a governmental technique that functions by 
producing the human individual as a specific kind of subject capable of 
repaying its debts: neoliberal homo œconomicus; or, as in Foucault’s (2010: 
226) famous formulation, ‘an entrepreneur of the self’. Under the auspices of 
guilt and responsibility, debt locks the subject into a relation to the self that 
reduces all aspects of social and psychological life to human capital, that is, 
investments which can generate the profits from which one can reimburse 
her creditors. 
What is particularly prescient about Lazzarato’s analysis is that it 
doesn’t simply concern private debts, as in those which individuals enter 
through contracts, but also encompasses sovereign debts such as those at the 
centre of the Greek crisis for which citizens are made to become guilty and 
responsible. That said, understanding how sovereign debt is used to govern 
the subject is not straightforward; it requires a clarification of the linkage 
between the macroeconomic scale of public debt and the individual. After all, 
bonds and various other sovereign debt instruments are not contracts 
involving private individuals but are made between states and their lenders. 
What is the link which binds the individual, in a relation of guilt and 
responsibility no less, to sovereign debt? 
For Lazzarato (2012: 123-125), the answer is that the transformation 
of social security from a social right to social debt forges this linkage by 
transforming ‘welfare’ into a credit issued by the state which must be repaid 
by the individual. In the debt economy, the logic of welfare as social debt 
becomes the terrain upon which the mnemotechnics of debt flourishes: 
social debt becomes reified as budget deficits and citizens become 
‘responsible’ and thus ‘guilty’ for the ‘overaccumulation’ of sovereign debt 
through their laziness, profligacy, and general lack of entrepreneurial spirit. 
This mediates between the macroeconomic aspects of the debt economy and 
the subject by tying social spending (that individuals make use of) to 
sovereign debt. Within this paradigm, austerity policies are thus not only a 
way of making the state ‘leaner’ and thus more attractive to its lenders, but 
simultaneously a means of transforming individuals into responsible and 
entrepreneurial subjects by radically reengineering social policy (through 
privatisations, outsourcing or by making welfare policies more panoptic and 
punitive, for example).   
A Greek Mnemotechnics of Debt 
As the Greek crisis has unfolded, Lazzarato’s analysis of debt as a 
governmental mnemotechnics has become a useful analytical framework for 
several authors (Kioupkiolis, 2014; Selmic, 2016; Stavrakakis, 2013). Among 
these, Radman Selmic’s development of Lazzarato’s framework to analyse 
the Greek crisis is particularly interesting, precisely because it draws close 
attention to the ways in which the gap between sovereign debt and the 
subject was mediated through the mnemotechnics of debt. 
 Selmic (2016: 46) follows Lazzarato in differentiating two discrete 
but interconnected registers of debt: the ‘production of indebtedness 
through financial instruments, on the one hand, and the production of 
subjectivity on the other.’ In the Greek case, Selmic argues, the ‘machinic’ 
production of debt refers to the macroeconomic work of organisations such 
as the ECB, which operates through a ‘set of non-representational, mostly 
abstract, quantitative decisions,’ such as the extension of acceptable 
collateral for sovereign borrowers,’ (52). For Selmic, these macroeconomic 
and machinic elements are correlated to a representational register that 
operates in the orders of subjectivity and social relations. During the Greek 
crisis, the mnemotechnics of debt operated in this register, producing 
‘feelings of guilt and responsibility’ that were designed to legitimise – and 
thus make it possible to impose – the ‘machinic’ transformations of the Greek 
economy.   
In distinguishing between the machinic procedures of debt and its 
representational correlates, Selmic draws attention to the disjunction 
between the abstract, purely technical operations of sovereign debt and the 
(discursive, speaking) subject. To traverse this disjunction, a logic of social 
debt and a corresponding mnemotechnics are articulated in the 
representational register of discourse so that the macroeconomic aspects of 
the debt economy and the subject become intertwined. For Selmic: 
The manner in which responsibility and ethics vis-à-vis Greek public debt were 
discussed and structured in public and subsequently perceived and 
internalised by Greek citizens was one of the crucial elements in imposing and 
executing austerity measures […] Greek citizens were publicly shamed […] in 
order to experience a deep sense of responsibility. (53) 
Here, the linkages between sovereign debt and the citizen is developed 
through a discourse in which the former is the result of a ‘budget deficit’ for 
which the latter is responsible. Sovereign debt thus becomes ‘their’ (that is, 
the Greek people’s) public debt through a discourse in which social spending 
becomes social debt that is reified as a budget deficit.  
An important implication here is that the relation between the 
economic fact of sovereign debt and the individual subject was by no means 
automatic,1 the mnemotechnics of debt was not intrinsic to Greece’s 
sovereign debt but was constituted as part of a discourse of social debt that 
was designed to forge the necessary links between the machinic operations 
of debt at the macroeconomic scale and the subject. The demand for Greece 
 
1 As it would be in the individualised debt relation that is created when a subject enters into 
a private contract such as a mortgage. 
to repay its debts was thus managed through a conscious (as opposed to 
automatic) project of memory that could draw Greek citizens into relation 
with the debt and make them both guilty and responsible. In other words, 
the Greek crisis necessitated a retroactive development of memory to 
transform Greek schulden (debt) into Greek schuld (guilt). 
The media played a significant role in cultivating this memory project. 
Although it has often seemed a truism that in the Greek case ‘feelings of guilt 
were purposely spread through biased press and expert analyses,’ (Selmic, 
2016: 53) there have now been several studies of domestic and international 
news media, which tend to support this claim (Bickes, Otten, & Weymann, 
2014; Mylonas, 2014; Tseligka, 2016).  
In a particularly compelling critical discourse analysis of the Greek 
domestic press, Yiannis Mylonas’ (2014) shows how Ekathimerini, a large, 
mainstream Greek newspaper of both liberal and conservative orientation, 
was pivotal in fostering a Greek mnemotechnics of debt. Through his analysis, 
Mylonas finds that there are two separate but mutually reinforcing logics that 
were produced by media discourses at the time. Firstly, Mylonas shows that 
media discourses tended to construct the Greek crisis as a cultural problem, 
one of the Mediterranean as a ‘leisure zone’ (310). In this construction, Greek 
profligacy operates at the structural and individual level: the crisis is 
understood to be both the problem of a bloated and wasteful state and a 
moral failing regarding the ‘lifestyle and habits of laypeople,’ (311). In other 
words, social spending becomes social debt for which the Greek people are 
responsible; the overaccumulation of debt here becomes the result of a 
culture of laziness and profligacy. As such, the discourse of social debt 
immediately ensnares Greek citizens in the mnemotechnics of debt: 
sovereign (now framed as public) debt becomes their promise for which they 
must now take responsibility. 
This mnemotechnics is dovetailed by a second and interconnected 
discourse, which frames the crisis as a moment for the Greek people to face 
their responsibilities. But this is also a necessity with hidden opportunities. 
Through news reporting and commentary articles, ‘prolonged austerity 
appears as essential for a “new Greece” to emerge, that is (economically) 
dynamic, entrepreneurial, and more European,’ (313). Consequently, the 
media discourses surrounding the Greek crisis reflect a slightly different 
instantiation of the imperative to become a responsibilised, entrepreneurial 
subject. Not only is becoming an entrepreneurial subject (through significant 
reductions in public spending as well as other changes in social and economic 
policy) proffered as the only means by which Greece can meet its 
responsibilities, but it is also framed as ‘an opportunity for the “true Greek” 
to emerge in his full creative and productive potential,’ (313). In this way, ‘the 
signifying semiotics of the media,’ as Lazzarato (2014: 14) contends, 
constructed a mnemotechnics of guilt and blame that not only could ‘justify 
in the eyes of individuated subjects […] the fact that “there is no alternative”,’ 
but presents these strictures as a strategic opportunity for growth. 
Memory-Making and Counter-Memory 
If memory is central to neoliberalism’s austerity project in Greece, then, as I 
will now argue, the TCPD must be understood as a crucial response to the 
specifically mnemotechnical aspects of this project. The argument I aim to 
develop is that the TCPD develops a counter-memory through its own project 
of memory-making.  Developing this point first requires an outline of what is 
understood by the term ‘memory-making’. From there it will then be possible 
to situate the TCPD within this framework. 
Memory-making practices and institutions emerged most notably 
from within the human rights movement where the cultivation of collective 
memory has been understood as a bulwark against genocide and atrocity. 
This strand of memory-making has its roots in holocaust memorialisation and 
has now become a form of globalised and cosmopolitan memory whose 
mission is ensure that a repetition of the past happens ‘never again!’ (Levy & 
Sznaider, 2004). Although the context of human rights and genocide seems 
far removed from the Greek case as it confronts us here, there are several 
interconnections between practices of memory-making developed within the 
human rights movement and the development of the TCPD which are worth 
exploring.  
Since the 1980s, the human rights movement has developed several 
institutional memory-making practices that are now seen as essential to the 
process of post-conflict and/or post-regime peacebuilding. Of particular 
concern here is the development of truth commissions, an institutional form 
developed in post-dictatorial Argentina and Chile, but which finds it most 
paradigmatic example in the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission which marked the end of the apartheid regime. Typically, truth 
commissions are quasi-juridical institutions that endeavour to develop an 
authoritative version of the past, normally achieved by inviting both human 
rights victims and perpetrators to tell their stories in public hearings as well 
as by examining public documents. The truths gathered through these 
practices are then knitted together to make an overarching narrative about 
the past, usually in a published public report. Truth commissions thus create 
‘a version of history that informs, and is informed by, the memories of those 
involved – a shared truth […] that allows sense to be made of a traumatic 
past and is a prerequisite for a stable future,’ (Brants & Klep, 2013: 38). 
Institutional memory-making is thus not only tied to the past but also 
to the future. Indeed, Alexandra Barahona de Brito (2015: 361) has argued 
that institutions like truth commissions are ‘membership-making 
apparatuses’ that function by producing narratives (or truths) capable of 
forging new post-conflict communal identities capable of overcoming the 
past. Furthermore, such identities are not politically neutral. They are 
organised around the social and political circumstances of post-conflict 
transition and reflect the political agendas of social elites. Truth commissions, 
as memory-making, shape the future by (re)working the past. They create 
‘social memory’ which defines ‘the scope and nature of action, reorders 
reality and legitimates power holders.’ They are thus instruments ‘to 
legitimate discourse, create loyalties and justify political options […] what and 
how societies choose to remember and forget largely determines their future 
options.’ 
In this sense, the discourses and practices that are used to identify 
and construct the key concerns of the past are central to the future that is 
being created. As Zinaida Miller (2008: 261) points out, institutional practices 
such as truth commissions are ‘definitional projects’ whose specific ways of 
seeing and constructing the past defines the nature of injustice and 
victimhood, as well as concepts of repair, reparation, and remedy. Given their 
emergence from within the human rights movement, it can be no surprise 
that truth commissions are significantly shaped by human rights norms, 
values, legal codes, and discourses which determines the key concerns of the 
past (and, in doing so, the future). 
The development of the interdependences between memory-making 
and human rights has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the 
juridical grounding of human rights as a set of legal discourses recognised in 
international law, national constitutions, and so on, serves a strategic 
function. Catherine Turner (2013: 201) has argued that the legalism of human 
rights is useful ‘as a means of transcending existing political conflict,’ through 
the legitimacy and ‘formality of law and legal procedure.’ From this 
perspective, legal discourses usefully open up a terrain for the process of 
memory-making that is always already legitimate, in order to overcomes the 
divisive political claims and counter-claims of the past. Human rights law 
legitimises memory claims insofar as it furnishes them with a formal 
recognition that – ideally, at least – places it beyond the contentious realm of 
the political. 
On the other hand, critics have argued that the overreliance on 
human rights in the process of memory-making is problematic. In short, they 
argue that institutional practices tend to produce ‘invisibilities’ within the 
memories that they fabricate (Miller, 2008). The disposition of human rights 
lends it to an almost pathological concern with the physical cruelties 
committed in the past; violence against individual bodies perpetrated by the 
former regime. Consequently, issues of socioeconomic justice have often 
been excluded from post-conflict memory-making (Meister, 2011). Such 
exclusions tend to leave issues of social injustice unaddressed making them 
‘powder-kegs’ that have the potential to erupt within post-conflict societies, 
dragging them back into periods of renewed violence (Muvingi, 2009). In this 
sense, the ‘technocratic’ strength of human rights discourses is tempered 
somewhat by the limited scope within which it has defined and memorialised 
the past. 
The interesting point about the TCPD in Greece is that it substantially 
borrows from this model in ways which utilise the strengths of human rights 
memory-making whilst also overcoming these shortcomings through an 
interesting reconfiguration of human rights discourses that ultimately serves 
to confront the mnemotechnics of debt in strategically useful ways. In other 
words, what the TCPD achieved was a memory-making practices grounded in 
the legitimacy of human rights law that does not ignore questions of ‘the 
socioeconomic’. Rather, it explicitly confronts financialised neoliberalism at a 
central node of its diagram of power: memory. To understand this project of 
counter-memory, I will now contextualise the TCPD within the framework of 
memory-making and showing how it expands upon these practices to 
confront the mnemotechnics of debt. 
Counter-Memory: The ‘Greek Debt Truth Commission’ 
In developing this reading, one could begin by pointing to the lexical 
resonance between the Truth Committee on the Public Debt and the ‘truth 
commission’ that has become central to post-conflict memory-making. This 
linguistic affinity was transformed into equivalence through the development 
of an English language appeal website for the TCPD, a citizens initiative 
backed by the SYRIZA government, which referred to the committee as the 
‘Greek Debt Truth Commission’ (Greekdebttruthcommission.org, 2015). 
Certainly, any nominative resemblances reflect a shared memory-making 
sensibilities and institutional approach. 
Like a truth commission, the TCPD (2015: 7-8) was an investigative 
body established to address the past through a construction of truth. 
Exploring Greek public debt between the years of 1980-2015, the committee 
was ‘given the mandate to investigate the truth about the creation and the 
intolerable increase in the public debt.’ Further, its investigations were also 
shaped by a desire to interrogate the legitimacy and legality of the Greek 
debt with reference to the doctrine of Odious Debt in International Law so as 
to formulate ‘arguments and [trace] the legal foundations concerning the 
cancellation of the debt.’ Although the nature of some of these arguments 
will be explored in more detail later, it is worth mentioning that this legal 
approach also draws it into close conceptual proximity with human rights 
memory-making. Many of its legal arguments were grounded in international 
human rights law, insofar as debts were considered ‘Odious’ if they violated 
the human rights of Greek citizens.  
This mandate was pursued with investigative techniques not dissimilar 
to those of ‘ordinary’ truth commissions. The Committee’s investigation 
involved public testimonies taken from various witnesses and authorities, 
including the IMF representatives in Greece, and former Greek ministers such 
as Panayiotis Roumeliotis whose testimony would prove explosive and did 
much to raise the public profile of the commission (Toussaint & Lemoine, 
2017: 48). The TCPD (2015: 8-9) also examined all documentation pertaining 
to Greece’s public debt including official documents, contracts, treaties, as 
well official statistics, and so on. Finally, in keeping with the tradition of truth 
commissions it encouraged members of the public to participate in ‘truth-
telling’ as experts, witnesses, and sources.  
Importantly, this institutional framework was not designed simply to 
produce legal arguments regarding the Greek debt that could be used in 
ostensibly private negotiations between the SYRIZA government and its 
creditors. Rather, the TCPD (2015: 9) was designed to raise awareness 
amongst Greek citizens, and ‘to define specific issues that need to be brought 
into public consideration.’ The TCPD’s Preliminary Report reflected this 
purpose. It was thus written in plain, non-technical language so it could ‘be 
read by people without specialist technical knowledge, who however form 
the bulk of any society, and participate as they must in democratic 
deliberation.’ As such, the TCPD encompassed not only the institutional 
trappings but also the spirit of memory-making insofar as it used various 
institutional practices not only to investigate the public debt but also to give 
shape to a public and shared memory of it. 
Of course, memory-making is more than just a reconstruction of the 
past for its own sake. It is a process of remembering that is always connected 
to and thus serves a particular vision future. In this sense, the TCPD should be 
understood as a ‘memory-making apparatus’ not simply because it was 
concerned with constructing a memory about the debt, but because efforts 
to construct a narrative about the debt could and should have given a 
different shape to Greece’s future. This raises the critical question of what 
kind of future the TCPD engenders.  
My argument is that the TCPD was designed to resist the authoritarian 
imposition of austerity by producing a counter-memory to the 
mnemotechnics of debt. Where the latter cast the Greek people as ostensibly 
guilty ‘social debtors’ deserving of their fate, the TCPD’s counter-memory 
contested this logic by developing a narrative of their innocence, and, 
conversely, the guilt of Greece’s creditors. The future orientation of this 
strategy can be understood when it is contextualised within and read through 
the Committee’s own concern with truth-finding and -making as both a 
democratic right of Greek citizens and of practical import for the purposes of 
democracy and ‘democratic deliberation’ (TCPD, 2015: 8-9). Such desires for 
democracy clearly stands in opposition to the Troika’s authoritarian 
imposition of austerity and reflect the first SYRIZA government’s broader 
concern with building a democratic future. Constructing a counter-memory of 
Greek innocence might therefore be read as a way tracing a path from the 
Troika’s authoritarianism to the possibility of democracy by reversing the 
logic which gives the former legitimacy and makes austerity socially 
inevitable. 
 This can be recast in the theoretical terms I set out earlier in this 
chapter. If, as Lazzarato (2012: 71) argues, the mnemotechnics of debt locks 
the future up within the framework of authoritarian austerity, then memories 
of Greek innocence shatter this closure, creating a space in which democratic 
decision-making regarding Greece’s future might (re)emerge. The TCPD’s 
preliminary report ‘remembered’ the debt so as to give shape to new future 
options in a situation where the social imaginary had been closed within the 
framework of austerity. This reading of the TCPD can be demonstrated 
through an analysis of the Preliminary Report and the ways in which it 
confronts dominant narratives regarding Greek sovereign debt. 
Against Social Debt: The Arguments of the TCPD 
Set out across several chapters, the Preliminary Report of the TCPD develops 
several significant arguments that challenge the terms upon which the 
excesses of the sovereign debt are understood to be the result of social debts 
accrued by a profligate, non-entrepreneurial citizenry draining the resources 
of the state. The first chapter is particularly prescient as it develops a 
historical analysis, beginning in 1980, that traces the accumulation of 
Greece’s sovereign debt. Not only does it show that public expenditure was 
lower than other Eurozone countries, but that, ‘rather than being the product 
of a high budget deficit, the increase of debt was clearly related to the 
growth in interest payments,’ (TCPD: 2015: 11). In other words, debt servicing 
rather than out of control social or welfare spending was a key reason for the 
large accumulation of the debt between 1980 and 2007.  
Alongside this, the first chapter shows that in this first period before 
the financial crash, other facts such as excessive defence (and not welfare) 
spending, tax evasion by Greece’s richest individuals and companies, illicit 
capital outflows, and huge reductions in corporation tax (from 40% to 25%) 
contributed to this growing debt (TCPD, 2015: 11-14). As such, the logic of 
social debt becomes quite dubious. The mnemotechnics of guilt is severed 
through a forensic accounting that demonstrates the innocence of the ‘social’ 
(and thus the individual) regarding the accumulation of sovereign debt. 
But if the pre-crash history of Greek sovereign debt put the logic of 
social debt into question, the TCPD’s excavation of post-crash sovereign debt 
(accumulated from 2010-2015) made in chapter 2 is perhaps even more 
damning. This was a period in which Greek state accumulated most of its 
debt. In fact, the bailouts saw the debt increase ‘from €299.690 Billion, 
129.7% of GDP, to €317.94, 177.1% of GDP,’ (TCPD, 2015: 20). But this was 
not the result of a profligate state or its citizens. The key preliminary finding 
of the report is that the bailouts of the Greek state were mechanisms by 
which, first, European and Greek Banks could reduce their exposure to 
private and public debt, rather than to rescue the state and its citizens (TCPD, 
2015: 17-20).  
Seemingly technocratic responses to debt problems (themselves a 
practical rendering of neoliberalism’s famous maxim ‘There is no 
Alternative!’) thus increasingly look like a monumental stitch up where what 
might be called ‘the social’ is totally abandoned to prop up the financial 
sector. As the TCPD (2015: 20) summarised, ‘the two support programmes for 
Greece were a colossal bail-out of private creditors.’ This point becomes 
clearer if one considers that the financial sector was prioritised over small 
bondholders (individuals who had invested in government bonds as an 
apparently ‘zero risk’ form of saving) who were left to incur significant losses. 
As the TCPD (2015: 20) argues, around 15,000 families lost their life savings in 
this way, with 17 suicides recorded amongst those who lost their savings. 
In this way, the TCPD significantly challenges the mnemotechnics of 
debt so keenly developed not only by Greece’s creditors but also by the 
media. Where a mnemotechnics of Greek guilt has come to dominate, the 
TCPD reverses this logic not only by severing the link between sovereign debt 
and the social but by articulating the guilt of the creditor class conglomerated 
around central and private banks and the broader financial sector. In the 
creation of counter-memory, creditor guilt comes to be opposed to Greek 
society’s innocence. 
Innocence and Victimhood: Human Rights and Blank Slates? 
This mnemotechnical reversal is significantly bolstered by its development 
through legal discourses. Above all, this served the purpose of shielding what 
was essentially a set of political claims regarding the debt within the 
seemingly technocratic legitimacy of Law. On the one hand, this legalism 
meant its arguments could not, in theory at least, be ignored Greece’s 
creditors. After all, Central Banks, International Financial Institutions and 
states alike are bound by international law. Consequently, the TCPD had a 
kind of force majeure – albeit sadly unrealised, such that its arguments might 
have reversed the logic of social debt in a substantial, material way (debt 
cancellation). On the other hand, by rendering its reversal of the 
mnemotechnics within the ‘politically neutral’ discourses of the law, the TCPD 
gave social legitimacy to its counter-memory of Greek innocence 
substantiating the ground upon which alternative futures could be imagined 
and made.  
The Doctrine of Odious Debt drawn upon and developed by the TCPD 
is strongly grounded in the norms, customs, and principles of human rights 
law (Bantekas & Vivien, 2016: 543). It organised the TCPD’s legal arguments 
into a four-fold distinction between different kinds of ‘odious’ debt: 
illegitimate, illegal, odious and unsustainable debt. Each reflects a different 
problematisation of the debt as well as the terms and conditions attached to 
it, including: technical irregularities related to the contract (illegal debt); 
terms or conditions of the debt which are morally unfair or unconscionable 
(illegitimate debt); or, conditions that conflict with fundamental human rights 
provisions and the democratic right to self-determination (odious debt); or, 
conditions that compromise the state’s future capacity to protect 
fundamental human rights (unsustainable debt). 
In the chapter titled ‘the Impact of the “Bailout Programme” on 
Human Rights’, the TCPD drew on this four-fold framework to understand the 
impact of various loan agreements on both civil and political rights, and their 
less-used social and economic counterparts. In fact, the report devoted 
significant attention to the impact of the debt on several socio-economic 
human rights, including the rights to work, to health and to education, social 
security and so on. For example, the report (TCPD 2015: 38-39) concludes 
that the right to health was undermined by the conditionalities attached to 
the Greek bailouts insofar as they resulted in ‘cuts to healthcare spending, 
lay-offs in the public health sector […] decimation of hospital bed, and 
increasingly restricted public health insurance.’ By 2015 the latter had meant 
that 2.5 million persons (25% of the population) were left without health 
insurance.  
The report carefully outlines legal liability for these violations, and 
attributes them to various creditors. For example, the report argues that the 
‘IMF is required to refrain from steps that would undermine the possibility of 
a borrowing State complying with its own national and international human 
rights obligations,’ (TCPD, 2015: 47). In imposing certain conditions upon 
credit lent to Greece, the IMF has thus broken its obligations in international 
law. Consequently, the report finds that Greek debts owed to various 
creditors are illegal, illegitimate and odious. In light of these findings, the 
report concludes by setting out the legal routes Greece could pursue to 
repudiate and suspend its sovereign debt. 
It is worth noting that while this approach clearly roots the TCPD 
within the tradition of human rights memory-making, it also overcomes the 
limitations of the latter by developing an accounting of the ‘social’ that 
centres the economic violences of financial institutions and processes. 
Crucially, in developing through legal accounting of the debt and its social 
consequences, the TCPD concretises the distinction between Greek 
innocence and the guilt of creditors through the legal categories of victim and 
perpetrator. Of course, the human rights victim has long been understood as 
an ‘innocent’ (Mutua, 2001; Meister, 2011). Accordingly, if the 
mnemotechnics of guilt is given legitimacy by the contract and by an 
accounting of debt, then human rights victimhood puts this guilt into 
question by forwarding an accounting of innocence that is underpinned by 
both the morality and force of law.  
If this counter-memory, in theory at least, has both legitimacy and 
legality on its side, then this opens out onto the broader question of both its 
potential and consequences within the Greek crisis. In thinking through this 
question, I am reminded of Miranda Joseph’s conceptualisation of resistance 
to financialised neoliberalism, and its proliferations of measurement, 
calculation, and accounting. For Joseph (2015: 140-142) projects of resistance 
must hope to constitute ‘an alternative “we”.’ Nevertheless, any attempt to 
forge new collectives is conditioned by the responsibilities and opportunities 
of the conjuncture it hopes to escape from. There is thus a danger that 
staking resistance out on the idea that human and life and the social world 
are beyond the crude logics of cost/benefit calculation is doomed to fall on 
deaf ears because it is not sufficiently attentive to these constraints.  
To create the conditions for an alternative ‘we’, Joseph argues, 
resistance to financialised neoliberalism must begin by ‘supplementing 
accounting with accountability,’ so that it can ‘push accounting to its limits as 
we also stake a claim to goals, values, not currently articulated within the 
regime of accounting.’ In other words, the possibility of forming new 
collectives emerges not by escaping the logic of accounting or measurement 
altogether, ‘but rather through its appropriation and transformation.’  
It is hard to imagine an experiment more representative of Joseph’s 
thinking than the ‘Greek Debt Truth Commission’. Through its own 
appropriation of actuarial and legal knowledges it presented an alternative 
legal accounting of the public debt, one that subverted dominant narratives 
and sought to make the creditors accountable to a ‘social’ they had been 
quick to externalise and abandon in the name of financial necessity. 
Moreover, when understood as ‘memory-making’ the TCPD is also drawn into 
a clear relation with the production of an alternative ‘we’. After all, as I 
showed earlier, social memory is nothing if it is not a ‘membership-making 
apparatus’ (Barahona de Brito, 2010). A key point, therefore, is to understand 
what kind of futures, what kind of alternative collective identities, are opened 
up by the memory of Greek victimhood and innocence. 
Still, this is not as simple as it may first appear. Victimhood has little 
content other than its innocence. There is no shortage of critics who 
understand that the downside of human rights victimhood is its ‘passivity,’ 
and ‘haplessness’ (Badiou, 2001; Mutua, 2001). In other words, victimhood is 
not only defined by its innocence but also by a lack of agency which is 
deferred to a ‘saviour’ who ‘bears witness’ and swoops in to save the day. 
Victimhood is critically marked by an absence or lack, rather than a 
substantive ‘identity’. From this standpoint, it is difficult not to have 
reservations about the ‘futurability’ of victimhood.   
Such pitfalls might be avoided, however, if we don’t consider 
victimhood valuable because it contains the raw materials for producing 
identity in its own right. Instead, we might understand the construction of 
victimhood as a strategically useful intervention whose limits come precisely 
as it announces the innocence it is designed to establish. From this 
perspective, victimhood serves as the crucial prerequisite of a tabula rasa – a 
blank slate – which necessarily exhausts its contents through this process. 
After all, innocence creates no identity other than the freedom it affords; it is 
exhausted in the creation of possibilities it presupposes. Blank slates are 
spaces of new emergences and new becomings; they are an emptiness which 
is not desolate but a new horizon of potentialities upon which an alternative 
future could be built.  
Consequently, if the TCPD creates a blank slated by nullifying 
neoliberalism’s mnemotechnics, then the forging of new identities requires 
the production of other social apparatuses, assemblages, and forms of life 
that are necessarily outside and beyond the remit of this institution. From 
this perspective, the promise of the TCPD was only one first step – among 
others – in the construction of an alternative ‘we’. For the Truth Committee 
and, more broadly, the first SYRIZA government, the substantive content of 
this ‘we’ was to emerge through democratic deliberation. Even if this project 
was never fully realised perhaps the night of the Greek referendum in July, 
only a few weeks after the release of the TCPD’s Preliminary Report, provides 
a glimpse of this democracy yet to come. In voting ‘όχι’ to the terms of the 
third bailout, Greek citizens had not only refused the economic constraints 
placed upon them by the Troika, but in taking hold of this opportunity began 
to constitute an alternative ‘we’ based not on victimhood but political 
agency. As Alex Tsipras would put it ‘Today’s no is a big yes to democratic 
Europe. A no to a vision of the eurozone as a boundless iron cage for its 
people. From tomorrow, Europe, whose heart tonight beats in Greece, starts 
healing its wounds, our wounds,’ (quoted in The Guardian, 2015). 
Conclusion: Failures and Legacies 
By September 2015, the political excitement which had gripped Greece in 
June and early July was extinguished. The referendum result didn’t prove 
enough on its own to resist the formidable powers of the Troika, and by 2016 
the ‘Greek Debt Truth Commission’ was largely forgotten. The capitulation of 
the SYRIZA government is reflected in the far less radical and far more 
accommodating stance it has taken since it won its second term following the 
agreement of a third Greek bailout. Furthermore, while cracks have appeared 
in the edifice of neoliberalism, such that even the IMF has now deemed 
public criticism of its key tenets a necessary PR exercise (See: Ostry, Loungani, 
& Furceri, 2016), the logics, practices and assumptions of neoliberal 
governance remain fundamentally in place. In judging both SYRIZA and the 
TCPD from this vantage point, it is easy to emphasise their failures. 
Nevertheless, what I have tried to show is the valuable contribution 
that the TCPD has made in terms of both conceptual tools with which to 
critically approach the debt economy but also material practices that might 
resist it. Following Lazzarato, I have argued that the debt economy functions 
by transforming memory into a mechanism of social control. Post-crash 
neoliberalism is thus defined by a mnemotechnics of debt that constrains 
both the present and the future within the logics of financial calculation, an 
accounting which transforms the social world into collateral damage 
sacrificed at the altar of the economy. This being the case, the value of the 
TCPD is in developing practices that function at the level of memory, a 
counter-mnemotechnics, which is capable of transforming guilt into 
innocence and, in doing so, prising open a new field of possibilities for the 
future of ‘the social’.   
Recent research affirming the legitimacy of the TCPD’s arguments 
under international law (Bantekas & Vivien, 2016) affords a certain 
confidence in the central tenets of its approach, and as such raises the 
possibility of the model’s appropriation, development, and transformation in 
future. In this sense, perhaps the legacy of ‘Greek Debt Truth Commission’ is 
to sketch out a terrain of struggle – memory – and a set of tools that are 
equal to it and may, someday, contribute to our escape from the debt 
economy. No doubt, future experiments will have to critically develop these 
tools, by asking, for example, whether its top-down, institutional approach is 
the best vehicle for a memory-making process designed to forge new 
solidarities, identities, or grass roots movements. As such, my hope is that the 
TCPD marks a starting point for a new series of political experiments, rather 
than signalling an end. 
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